America at War and Peace, 1801–1824
JEFFERSON’S TRIUMPH IN

the election of 1800, which Federalists
interpreted as a victory for the
“worthless, the dishonest, the rapacious,
the vile and ungodly,” left a bitter taste.
Nevertheless, in his inaugural address,
Jefferson struck a conciliatory note.
He traced the political convulsions
of the 1790s to different responses
to the French Revolution, an external
event whose fury had passed. What
Americans needed to recognize was
that they agreed on essentials, that “we are all republicans, we are all
federalists.”

Contrary to Jefferson’s expectations, foreign affairs continued to agitate American
politics. A month before Jefferson’s inauguration, Tripoli declared war on the United
States. Tripoli was one of four Islamic states in North Africa—the others were Algiers,
Morocco, and Tunis—that extorted tribute and ransom from nations whose merchant
ships sailed the Mediterranean Sea. America’s achievement of independence
had deprived it of the protection of Britain’s powerful navy, and, since 1785, these
“Barbary pirates” had been seizing American vessels and enslaving their crews.
The Muslim states sometimes justified their enslavement of Christian “infidels” on
religious grounds but, as an American diplomat recognized, “Money is th[eir] God.”
Not just money, but a lot of it. In 1796, the United States agreed to pay the ruler of
Algiers nearly $1 million—the largest item in the U.S. budget and equal to 16 percent
of all federal revenue in 1795—to stop seizing American ships. With its tiny navy, the
United States had little choice.

Jefferson’s enemies viewed him as a dreamy philosopher, and even his friends
conceded that national defense was not his strong suit. During the Quasi-War
with France in 1798, Jefferson had opposed strengthening the navy, a view consistent
with his loathing of expensive government. But Jefferson recognized that the
pirate states, once bribed, would not stay bribed; they would demand greater “trib-
utes and humiliations.” Tripoli warred on the United States because its ruler wanted
a bigger bribe than he was already receiving. Suspecting that it might be cheaper
to fight than to pay tribute, Jefferson authorized hostilities. The ensuing Tripolitan
War (1801–1805) ended favorably for the United States. No thanks to Jefferson, the
American navy had expanded during the Quasi-War and gave a good account of itself
in the Mediterranean.

American naval success also depended on European events over which it had no con-
trol. The United States had fought Tripoli without harassment from Britain. However,
starting in 1805, Britain—alarmed by the French emperor Napoleon’s military suc-
cesses on the European continent—renewed its seizure of American merchant ships
bound for ports controlled by Napoleon. In 1807, the American warship Chesapeake,
We are all republicans, we are all federalists.

The flagship of a squadron bound for the Mediterranean to police the peace with Tripoli, was attacked just off the American coast and forced to surrender to a British warship. The squadron was called back, Tripoli demanded more money, and the United States paid it.

Jefferson’s answer to the renewed seizure of American ships was the Embargo Act of 1807, a self-blockade in which the United States sought to influence Britain and France by denying American trade to each. This policy of “peaceable coercion” failed, and in 1812 the United States went to war with Britain to secure respect for its trading rights as a neutral. It again failed. The treaty ending the War of 1812 did not guarantee neutral rights. Ironically, however, the outcome of the war revealed how developments in Europe at times worked to the advantage of the United States. The treaty coincided with Napoleon’s decline. With peace in Europe, American trading ships enjoyed freedom of the seas for the next century. The American navy returned to the Mediterranean in 1815, trounced Algiers (the most aggressive of the pirate states), and then forced all the Barbary states to abandon forever their claims for tribute from the United States.

These developments fed American pride. The United States was no longer an international joke. However, the harmony for which Jefferson longed proved elusive. During Jefferson’s two terms and those of his successors in the “Virginia Dynasty,” James Madison and James Monroe, the Federalist party first declined and then collapsed as a force in national politics. Yet the Federalists’ decline opened the way to intensified factionalism within the Republican party, especially during Jefferson’s second term (1805–1809) and during the mistakenly named Era of Good Feelings (1817–1824). Most ominously, between 1819 and 1821, northern and southern Republicans split over the extension of slavery into Missouri.

**The Age of Jefferson**

Narrowly elected in 1800, Jefferson saw his popularity rise during his first term when he moved quickly to scale down government expenditures. Increasingly confident of popular support, he worked to loosen the Federalists’ grip on appointive federal offices, especially in the judiciary. His purchase of Louisiana against Federalist opposition added to his popularity. In all of these moves, Jefferson was guided not merely by political calculation, but also by his philosophy of government—eventually known as Jeffersonianism.

**Jefferson and Jeffersonianism**

A man of extraordinary attainments, Jefferson was fluent in French, read Latin and Greek, and studied several Native American languages. He served for more than twenty years as president of America’s foremost scientific association, the American Philosophical Society. A student of architecture, he designed his own mansion in Virginia, Monticello. Gadgets fascinated him. He invented a device for duplicating his letters, of which he wrote over twenty thousand, and he improved the design for a revolving book stand, which enabled him to consult up to five books at once. His public career was luminous: principal author of the Declaration of Independence, governor of Virginia, ambassador to France, secretary of state under Washington, and vice president under John Adams.

Yet he was, and remains, a controversial figure. His critics, pointing to his doubts about some Christian doctrines and his early support for the French Revolution, portrayed him as an infidel and radical. Federalists alleged that he kept a slave mistress, and in 1802 James Callender, a former supporter furious about not receiving a government job he wanted, wrote a newspaper account naming her as Sally Hemings, a house slave at Monticello. Drawing on the DNA of Sally’s male descendants and linking the timing of Jefferson’s visits to Monticello with the start of Sally’s pregnancies, most scholars now view it as very likely that Jefferson, a widower, was the father of at least one of her four surviving children.

Callender’s story did Jefferson little damage in Virginia, because Jefferson had acted according to the rules of white Virginia gentlemen by never acknowledging any of Sally’s children as his own. Although he freed two of her children (the other two ran away), he never freed Sally, the daughter of

**FOCUS Questions**

- How did Jefferson’s philosophy shape policy toward public expenditures, the judiciary, and Louisiana?
- What led James Madison to go to war with Britain in 1812?
- How did the War of 1812 influence American domestic politics?
- To what extent did Jefferson’s legacy persist into the Era of Good Feelings?
Jefferson’s own father-in-law and so light-skinned that she could pass for white, nor did he ever mention her in his vast correspondence. Yet the story of Sally fed the charge that Jefferson was a hypocrite, for throughout his career he condemned the very “race-mixing” to which he appears to have contributed.

Jefferson did not believe that blacks and whites could live permanently side by side in American society. As the black population grew, he feared a race war so vicious that it could be suppressed only by a dictator. This view was consistent with his conviction that the real threat to republics rose less from hostile neighbors than from within. He believed that the French had turned to a dictator, Napoleon Bonaparte, to save them from the chaos of their own revolution. Only by colonizing blacks in Africa, an idea embodied in the American Colonization Society (1816), could America avert a similar fate, he believed.

Jefferson worried that high taxes, standing armies, and corruption could destroy American liberty by turning government into the master rather than servant of the people. To prevent tyranny, he advocated that state governments retain considerable authority. In a vast republic, he reasoned, state governments would be more responsive to the popular will than would the government in Washington.

He also believed that popular liberty required popular virtue. For republican theorists like Jefferson, virtue consisted of a decision to place the public good ahead of one’s private interests and to exercise vigilance to keep governments from growing out of control. To Jefferson, the most vigilant and virtuous people were educated farmers who were accustomed to act and think with sturdy independence. Jefferson regarded cities as breeding grounds for mobs and as menaces to liberty. Men who relied on merchants or factory owners for their jobs could have their votes influenced, unlike farmers who worked their own land. When the people “get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe,” he wrote, “they will become corrupt as in Europe.”

Jefferson’s “Revolution”

Jefferson described his election as a revolution. But the revolution he sought was to restore the liberty and tranquility that (he thought) the United States had enjoyed in its early years and to reverse what he saw as a drift into despotism. The $10 million growth in the national debt under the Federalists alarmed Jefferson and his secretary of the treasury, Albert Gallatin. They rejected Hamilton’s idea that a national debt would strengthen the government by giving creditors a stake in its health. Just paying the interest on the debt would require taxes, which would suck money from industrious farmers—the backbone of the Republic. The money would then fall into the hands of creditors, parasites who leched off interest payments. Increased tax revenues might also tempt the government to establish a standing army, always a threat to liberty.

Jefferson and Gallatin secured the repeal of many taxes, and they slashed expenditures by closing some embassies overseas and reducing the army, which declined from an authorized strength of over 14,000 in 1798 to 3,287 in 1802. A lull in the war between Britain and France that had threatened American shipping in the 1790s persuaded Jefferson that minimal military preparedness was a sound policy: “We can now proceed without risks in demolishing useless structures of expense, lightening the burdens of our constituents, and fortifying the principles of free government.” This may have been wishful thinking, but it rested on a sound economic calculation, for the vast territory of the United States could not be secured from attack without astronomical expense.

Jefferson and the Judiciary

Jefferson hoped to conciliate the moderate Federalists, but conflicts over the judiciary derailed this objective. Washington and Adams had appointed only Federalists to the bench, including the new chief justice, John Marshall. Still bitter about the zeal of federal courts in enforcing the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson saw the Federalist-sponsored Judiciary Act of 1801 as the last straw. By reducing the number of Supreme Court justices from six to five, the act threatened to strip him of an early

When the people “get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe.”
opportunity to appoint a justice. At the same time, the act created sixteen new federal judgeships, which outgoing president John Adams had filled by last-minute (“midnight”) appointments of Federalists. To Jefferson, this was proof that the Federalists intended to use the judiciary as a stronghold from which “all the works of Republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.” In 1802, he won congressional repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801.

Jefferson's troubles with the judiciary were not over. On his last day in office, Adams had appointed a Federalist, William Marbury, as justice of the peace in the District of Columbia but failed to deliver Marbury’s commission before midnight. When Jefferson’s secretary of state, James Madison, refused to send him notice of the appointment, Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ compelling delivery. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the unanimous opinion. Marshall ruled that, although Madison should have delivered Marbury’s commission, he was under no legal obligation to do so because part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that had granted the Court the authority to issue such a writ as unconstitutional.

For the first time, the Supreme Court had asserted its authority to void an act of Congress on the grounds that it was “repugnant” to the Constitution. Jefferson did not reject this principle, known as the doctrine of judicial review and destined to become highly influential, but he was enraged that Marshall had used part of his decision to lecture Madison on his moral duty (as opposed to his legal obligation) to deliver Marbury’s commission. This gratuitous lecture, which was really directed at Jefferson as Madison’s superior, struck Jefferson as another example of Federalist partisanship.

While the Marbury decision was brewing, the Republicans took the offensive against the judiciary by moving to impeach (charge with wrongdoing)
two Federalist judges, John Pickering and Samuel Chase. Pickering, an insane alcoholic, was quickly removed from office, but Chase presented difficulties. He was a partisan Federalist notorious for jailing several Republican editors under the Sedition Act of 1798. Nonetheless, the Constitution specified that judges could be impeached only for treason, bribery, and “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Was impeachment appropriate because a judge was excessively partisan? Moderate Republicans came to doubt it, and partly for that reason, the Senate narrowly failed to convict Chase.

Chase’s acquittal ended Jefferson’s skirmishes with the judiciary. Unlike his radical followers, Jefferson objected neither to judicial review nor to an appointed judiciary; he merely challenged Federalist use of judicial power for political goals. Yet there was always a gray area between law and politics. To Federalists there was no conflict between protecting the Constitution and advancing their party’s cause. But nor did the Federalists attempt to use their control of the federal judiciary to undo Jefferson’s “revolution” of 1800. The Marshall court, for example, upheld the constitutionality of the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. For his part, Jefferson never proposed to impeach Marshall.

**Extending the Land: The Louisiana Purchase, 1803**

Jefferson’s goal of avoiding foreign entanglements would remain beyond reach as long as European powers had large landholdings in North America. Spain owned East Florida and the vast Louisiana Territory, including New Orleans, and it claimed West Florida (now the southern portions of Alabama and Mississippi). In 1800, a weakened Spain returned Louisiana to France which, under Napoleon Bonaparte, was fast emerging as Europe’s strongest military power. Jefferson was appalled.

The president had long imagined the inevitable expansion of the free and virtuous American people would create an “empire of liberty.” Spain was no obstacle, but Jefferson knew that Bonaparte’s capacity for mischief was boundless. Bonaparte was sure of his destiny as a conqueror, and he dreamed of re-creating a French New World empire bordering the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. The island of Saint Domingue (modern Haiti and the Dominican Republic) would be the fulcrum of the empire, and Louisiana would be its breadbasket. Before this dream could become a reality, however, the French would have to subdue Saint Domingue, where by 1800 a bloody slave revolution had resulted in a takeover of the government by the former slave Toussaint L’Ouverture (see Chapter 7). Bonaparte dispatched an army to reassert French control and reestablish slavery, but yellow fever and fierce resistance by former slaves doomed the French force.

In the short run, Jefferson worried most about New Orleans, the only port for the $3 million in annual produce of farmers along the Ohio and Mississippi river system. The Spanish had temporarily granted Americans the right to park their produce there while awaiting transfer to seagoing vessels. But in 1802, the Spanish colonial administrator in New Orleans issued an order revoking this right. The order had originated in Spain, but most Americans assumed it had come from Bonaparte who, although he now owned Louisiana, had yet to take possession of it. An alarmed Jefferson described New Orleans as the “one single spot” on the globe whose possessor “is our natural and habitual enemy.” “The day that France takes possession of N. Orleans,” he added, “we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.”

The combination of France’s failure to subdue Saint Domingue and the termination of American rights to deposit produce in New Orleans led to the American purchase of Louisiana. Jefferson dispatched James Monroe and Robert R. Livingston to Paris to buy New Orleans from France. Meanwhile, Bonaparte had concluded that his Caribbean empire was not worth the cost. In addition, he planned to resume war in Europe and needed cash. So he decided to sell *all* of Louisiana. The American commissioners and the French government settled on a price of $15 million. Thus, the United States gained an immense, uncharted territory between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains (see Map 8.1). No one knew its exact size. Bonaparte’s minister merely observed that the bargain was noble. But the **Louisiana Purchase** virtually doubled the area of the United States at a cost, omitting interest, of thirteen and one-half cents an acre.

Jefferson found himself caught between his ideals and reality. No provision of the Constitution explicitly authorized the government to acquire new territory. Jefferson believed in strict construction—the doctrine that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its letter—but he recognized that doubling the size of the Republic would guarantee land for American farmers, the backbone of the nation and the true guardians of liberty. Strict construction was not an end in itself but a means to promote republican liberty. If that end could be achieved in some way other than by strict construction, so be it. Jefferson was also alert to practical considerations. Most Federalists opposed the Louisiana Purchase because

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Exploring the Land: The Lewis and Clark Expedition

Louisiana dazzled Jefferson’s imagination. Americans knew virtually nothing about the immense territory, not even its western boundary. A case could be made for the Pacific Ocean, but Spain claimed part of the Pacific coast. Jefferson was content to claim that Louisiana extended at least to the mountains west of the Mississippi, which few citizens of the United States had ever seen. Thus, the Louisiana Purchase was both a bargain and a surprise package.

The Election of 1804

Jefferson’s acquisition of Louisiana left the Federalists dispirited and without a popular national issue. As the election of 1804 approached, the main threat to Jefferson was not the Federalist Party but his own vice president, Aaron Burr. In 1800, Burr had tried to take advantage of a tie in the Electoral College to gain the presidency, a betrayal in the eyes of most Republicans who assumed he had been nominated for the vice presidency. The adoption in 1804 of the Twelfth Amendment, which required separate and distinct ballots in the Electoral College for the presidential and the vice-presidential candidates, clarified the electoral process, but did not end Burr’s conniving. He had spent much of his vice presidency in intrigues with the Federalists. The Republicans dumped him from their ticket in 1804 in favor of George Clinton. In the election, the Federalist nominees Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King carried only two states, failing to hold even Massachusetts. Jefferson’s overwhelming victory brought his first term to a fitting close. Between 1801 and 1804, the United States had doubled its territory and started to pay off its debt.

it would decrease the relative importance of their strongholds on the eastern seaboard. As the leader of the Republican Party, Jefferson saw no reason to hand the Federalists an issue by dallying over ratification of the treaty to reconcile constitutional issues.
brought them in contact with numerous tribes, most importantly the powerful Sioux but also Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras, each with a history of warring on other tribes and of carrying on its own internal feuds. Reliant on Indians for guides, packers, and interpreters, Lewis and Clark had to become instant diplomats. Jefferson had told them to assert American sovereignty over the Purchase. This objective led them to distribute medals and uniforms to chiefs ready to support American authority and to stage periodic military parades and displays of their weapons, which included cannons.

But no tribe had a single chief; rather, different tribal villages had different chiefs. At times, Lewis and Clark miscalculated, for example, when they treated an Arikara chief as the “grand chief” to the outrage of his rivals. Yet their diplomacy generally was successful, less because they were sophisticated ethnographers than because they avoided violence.

Even with their peaceful intent established, Lewis and Clark faced obstacles. The expedition brought them in contact with numerous tribes, most importantly the powerful Sioux but also Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras, each with a history of warring on other tribes and of carrying on its own internal feuds. Reliant on Indians for guides, packers, and interpreters, Lewis and Clark had to become instant diplomats. Jefferson had told them to assert American sovereignty over the Purchase. This objective led them to distribute medals and uniforms to chiefs ready to support American authority and to stage periodic military parades and displays of their weapons, which included cannons.

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The group finally reached the Pacific Ocean in November 1805 and then returned to St. Louis, but
Mapping America

We take maps for granted, but in Jefferson’s day few Americans knew what their nation looked like. Writing to Congress in 1777, George Washington had complained that “the want of accurate maps of the Country” placed him at “a great disadvantage.” Treating mapmaking as a public expense, the British government staffed its army with surveyors, whose skills were indispensable to making maps. As a result, the British often had a better knowledge of the American countryside than Washington’s army.

Washington himself was a surveyor, but American surveyors had been employed by land-seeking clients, not governments. This approach to mapping yielded local maps, some of which were biased since the clients had an interest in the outcome. Existing maps of entire colonies were compilations of local maps, subject to all the errors that had crept into local surveys and lacking any common geographic frame of reference.

The accurate mapping of large areas that Washington desired required government funding of many survey parties. A typical survey party included several axmen to clear trees, two chain bearers, two or three staff carriers, an instrument carrier, and the surveyor. Surveyors used several basic instruments, including a table equipped with paper, a compass, a telescope for measuring direction and heights, and an instrument for measuring angles called a theodolite. A surveyor first measured a baseline from one point to another, as marked by the chain bearers. Next, he commenced a process known as triangulation by picking a landmark in the distance, like a hilltop, and measuring its angle from the baseline. A staff man might be standing on the hilltop with a flag attached to his staff. Finally, the surveyor employed trigonometry to calculate the length of each side of the triangle, one of which would serve as the next baseline. For every hour spent walking a plot of land, the survey party would spend three hours recording their measurements on paper.

Washington’s complaint about inadequate maps led to the appointment of Scottish-born Robert Erskine as surveyor general of the Continental Army and to government funding of his workers. After the war, the Land Ordinance of 1785, which specified that public lands be surveyed and divided
By the time Jefferson launched the Lewis and Clark expedition to explore the Louisiana Purchase, better maps were available. Jefferson saw to it that Lewis and Clark carried a recent map by an Englishman, Aaron Arrowsmith. Arrowsmith’s map showed the Rocky Mountains, often omitted by other maps. But when Lewis and Clark reached the source of the Missouri River in June 1805, they found no sign of the Columbia, whose source the Arrowsmith map portrayed as a stone’s throw from the source of the Missouri, just “an immense range of high mountains.”

Their expedition established Lewis and Clark as authorities on the West and stimulated the public’s and states’ interest in geography. During their expedition, Lewis and Clark had benefited from accurate charts of local geography drawn by Indians on the ground with sticks or on hides with charcoal. Settled in St. Louis after the expedition, Clark received a stream of explorers and traders who brought him more information about the geography of the Purchase, enough to enable him to draw a manuscript map of the territory. When finally published in 1814, this map gave ordinary Americans their first picture of what Jefferson had bought in 1803. In 1816, John Melish, drawing on Clark’s map and his own travels, published by far the most accurate map yet of the United States.

By enabling ordinary Americans to see the vastness of their nation, Melish’s map subtly reinforced their sense that the West rightfully belonged to them, not to the Indians or anyone else. The negotiators of the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819, which gave the United States a claim to part of the Pacific coast, relied exclusively on the 1818 edition of Melish’s map. Melish’s example also spurred state legislatures to subsidize the drawing of accurate state maps. Hiring Melish in 1816, Pennsylvania became the first state to finance construction of a state map based wholly on “actual survey.” Melish was delighted. He had been insisting that “every state should have its own map” and that such maps should be state property, “subject to the control of no individual whatever.” Taking six years to complete, the project cost Pennsylvania $30,000 and exhausted Melish, who died shortly after the map’s publication. But other states were quick to follow Pennsylvania’s lead.

**QUESTION FOR ANALYSIS**

- Early maps contained many inaccuracies, resulting not just from limits of technology and finance but also from widely held beliefs about what America should look like. Since Americans acted on the basis of their beliefs, how much did maps actually shape events in the age of Jefferson?
This morning early we passed over and formed a camp on the point formed by the junction of the two large rivers. . . . An interesting question was now to be determined; which of these rivers was the Missouri. . . . To mistake the stream at this period of the season, two months of the traveling season having now elapsed, and to ascend such stream . . . and then be obliged to return and take the other stream would not only loose us the whole of this season but would probably so dishearten the party that it might defeat the expedition altogether. . . . The north fork is deeper than the other but it’s courant not so swift; it’s waters run in the same boiling and roling manner which has uniformly characterized the Missouri throughout its whole course so far; it’s waters are of a whitish brown colour[,] very thick and turbid, also characteristic of the Missouri; while the South fork is perfectly transparent [and] runs very rappid but with a smooth unriffl ed surface[,] it’s bottom composed of round and flat smooth stones like most rivers issuing from a mountainous country. The bed of the North fork [is] composed of some gravel but principally mud; in short the air & character of this river is so precisely that of the Missouri below that the party with very few exceptions have already pronounced the North fork to be the Missouri; myself and Capt. C[lark] not quite so precipitate have not yet decided but if we were to give our opinions I believe we should be in the minority, certain it is that the North fork gives the colouring matter and character which is retained from hence to the gulph of Mexico. . . . Convinced I am that if [the North fork] penetrated the Rocky Mountains to any great extent it’s waters would be clearer unless it should run an immense distance indeed after leaving those mountains through those level plains in order to acquire its turbid hue. What astonishes us a little is that the Indians who appeared to be so well acquainted with the geography of this country should not have mentioned this river on [the] right hand if it not be the Missouri; the river that scolds all others as they call it if there is in reality such an one, ought agreeably to their account to have fallen in a considerable distance below, and on the other hand if this right hand or North fork be the Missouri I am equally astonished at their not mentioning the South fork which they must have passed to get to those large falls which they mention on the Missouri. Thus have our cogitating faculties been busily employed all day.


QUESTION
1. Which fork would you have taken?
2. Why did President Jefferson think it was important to American strategic interests that Lewis and Clark find the source of the Missouri river?
not before collecting a mass of scientific information, including the disturbing fact that more than three hundred miles of mountains separated the Missouri from the Columbia. The expedition also produced a sprinkling of tall tales, many of which Jefferson believed, about gigantic Indians, soil too rich to grow trees, and a mountain composed of salt. Jefferson’s political opponents railed that he would soon be reporting the discovery of a molasses-filled lake. For all the ridicule, the expedition’s drawings of the geography of the region led to more accurate maps and heightened interest in the West.

The Gathering Storm

In gaining control of Louisiana, the United States had benefitted from the preoccupation of European powers with their own struggles. But between 1803 and 1814, the renewal of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe turned the United States into a pawn in a chess game played by others and helped make Jefferson’s second term far less successful than his first.

Europe was not Jefferson’s only problem. He had to deal with a conspiracy to dismantle the United States, the product of the inventive and perverse mind of Aaron Burr, and to face down challenges within his own party, led by John Randolph.

Challenges on the Home Front

Aaron Burr suffered a string of reverses in 1804. After being denied renomination as vice president, he entered into a series of intrigues with a faction of despairing and extreme (or “High”) Federalists in New England. Led by Senator Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, these High Federalists plotted to sever the Union by forming a pro-British Northern Confederacy composed of Nova Scotia (part of British-owned Canada), New England, New York, and even Pennsylvania. Although most Federalists disdained the plot, Pickering and others settled on Burr as their leader and helped make Jefferson’s nomination for the governorship of New York. Alexander Hamilton, who had thwarted Burr’s grab for the presidency in 1800 by throwing his weight behind Jefferson, now foiled Burr a second time by allowing publication of his “despicable opinion” of Burr. Defeated in the election for New York’s governor, Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel and mortally wounded him at Weehawken, New Jersey, on July 11, 1804.

Indicted in two states for murdering Hamilton, Burr—still vice president—now hatched a scheme so bold that not even his political opponents could believe him capable of such treachery. He allied himself with the unsavory military governor of the Louisiana Territory, General James Wilkinson, who had been on Spain’s payroll intermittently as a secret agent since the 1780s. Their plot had several dimensions: they would create an independent confederacy of western states, conquer Mexico, and invade West Florida. The scheming duo presented the plot imaginatively. To westerners, they said it had the covert support of the Jefferson administration; to the British, that it was a way to attack Spanish lands; and to the Spanish, that it would open the way to dividing up the United States.

By the fall of 1806, Burr and about sixty followers were making their way down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to join Wilkinson at Natchez. In October 1806, Jefferson, who described Burr as a crooked gun that never shot straight, denounced the conspiracy. Wilkinson abandoned the plot and proclaimed himself the most loyal of Jefferson’s followers. Burr tried to escape to West Florida but was intercepted. Brought back to Richmond, he was put on trial for treason. Chief Justice Marshall presided at the trial and instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove actual treasonable acts—an impossible task because the conspiracy had never reached fruition. Jefferson was furious, but Marshall was merely following the clear wording of the Constitution, which deliberately made treason difficult to prove. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. "Still under indictment for his murder of Hamilton, Burr fled to Europe where he tried to interest Napoleon in making peace with Britain as a prelude to

PLAINS PIPE BOWL instructed by Jefferson to acquaint themselves with the Indians’ “ordinary occupations in the arts,” Lewis and Clark collected this Lakota sacred pipe, whose red stone symbolized the flesh and blood of all people and whose smoke represented the breath that carries prayers to the Creator. Considering pipes sacred objects, Indians used them to seal contracts and treaties, and to perform ceremonial healing. (Peabody Museum, Harvard University #T3039)
a proposed Anglo-French invasion of the United States and Mexico.

Besides the Burr conspiracy, Jefferson faced a challenge from a group of Republicans led by the president's fellow Virginian, John Randolph, a man of abounding eccentricities and acerbic wit. Like many propertied Americans of the 1770s, Randolph believed that governments always menaced popular liberty. Jefferson had originally shared this view, but he recognized it as an ideology of opposition, not power; once in office, he compromised. In contrast, Randolph remained frozen in the 1770s, denouncing every government action as decline and proclaiming that he would throw all politicians to the dogs except that he had too much respect for dogs.

Randolph turned on Jefferson, most notably, for backing a compromise in the Yazoo land scandal. In 1795, the Georgia legislature had sold the huge Yazoo tract (35 million acres—most of present-day Alabama and Mississippi) for a fraction of its value to land companies that had bribed virtually the entire legislature. The next legislature canceled the sale, but many investors, knowing nothing of the bribery, had already bought land in good faith. In 1803, a federal commission compromised with an award of 5 million acres to Yazoo investors. For Randolph, the compromise was itself a scandal—further evidence of the decay of republican virtue.

**The Suppression of American Trade and Impressment**

Burr's acquittal and Randolph's taunts shattered the aura of invincibility surrounding Jefferson. Now foreign affairs posed an even sharper challenge. As Britain and France resumed their war in Europe, U.S. merchants prospered by carrying sugar and coffee from the French and Spanish Caribbean colonies to Europe. This trade not only provided Napoleon with supplies but also drove down the price of sugar and coffee from British colonies by adding to the glut of these commodities on the world market. The British concluded that their economic problems stemmed from American prosperity.

For Americans, this boom depended on the re-export trade, which evaded British regulations. According to the British Rule of 1756, any trade closed during peacetime could not be opened during war; if it was, the British would stop it. For example, France usually restricted the sugar trade with Europe to French ships during peacetime and thus could not open it to American ships during war. The U.S. response to the Rule of 1756 was the "broken voyage," by which U.S. ships carried French sugar or coffee to American ports, unloaded it, passed it through customs, and then re-exported it as American produce. Britain tolerated this dodge for nearly a decade but in 1805 initiated a policy of total war toward France, including the strangulation of French trade. In 1805, a British court declared broken voyages illegal.

Next came a series of British trade decrees ("Orders in Council"), which established a blockade of French-controlled ports on the coast of Europe. Napoleon responded with his so-called Continental System, a series of counterproclamations that ships obeying British regulations would be subject to seizure by France. In effect, this Anglo-French war of decrees outlawed virtually all U.S. trade; if an American ship complied with British regulations, it became a French target, and vice versa.

Both Britain and France seized American ships, but British seizures were far more humiliating to Americans. France was a weaker naval power than Britain; much of the French fleet had been destroyed by the British at the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805. Accordingly, most of France's seizures of American ships occurred in European ports where American ships had been lured by Napoleon's often inconsistent enforcement of his Continental System. In contrast, British warships hovered just beyond the American coast. The Royal Navy stopped and searched virtually every American vessel off New York, for example. At times, U.S. ships had to line up a few miles from the American coast to be searched by the Royal Navy.

To these provocations the British added impressment. For centuries, Royal Navy press gangs had scoured the docks and taverns of British ports and forced ("pressed") civilians into service. As war with France intensified Britain's need for sailors, Britain increasingly extended the practice to seizing alleged Royal Navy deserters on American merchant ships. British sailors had good reason to be discontented with their navy. Discipline on the Royal Navy's "floating hells" was often brutal and the pay low; sailors on American ships made up to five times more than those on British ships. Consequently, the Royal Navy suffered a high rate of desertion to American ships. In 1807, for example, 149 of the 419 sailors on the American warship *Constitution* were British subjects. Although less damaging to the American economy than the seizure of ships, impressment was equally galling. Even American-born seamen, six thousand between 1803 and 1812, were impressed into the Royal Navy. British arrogance peaked in June 1807. A British warship, HMS *Leopard*, patrolling off Virginia, attacked an unsuspecting American frigate, USS *Chesapeake*, and forced it to surrender. The British then boarded the vessel and seized four supposed deserters. One, a genuine deserter, was later hanged; the other
found new markets in South America, where rebellions against Spanish rule had flared up. Furthermore, the Embargo Act contained some loopholes. For example, it allowed American ships blown off course to put in at European ports if necessary; suddenly, many captains were reporting that adverse winds had forced them across the Atlantic. Treating the embargo as a joke, Napoleon seized any American ships he could lay hands on and then informed the United States that he was only helping to enforce the embargo. The British were less amused, but the embargo confirmed their view that Jefferson was an ineffectual philosopher, an impotent challenger compared with Napoleon.

The United States itself felt the harshest effects of the embargo. Some thirty thousand American seamen found themselves out of work. Hundreds of merchants went into bankruptcy, and jails swelled with debtors. A New York City newspaper noted that the only activity still flourishing in the city

three, former Britons, had “deserted” only from impressments and were now American citizens. The so-called Chesapeake-Leopard Affair enraged the country. Jefferson remarked that he had not seen so belligerent a spirit in America since 1775.

The Embargo Act of 1807

Yet while making some preparations for war, Jefferson adopted “peaceable coercion” by suspending trade with Britain and France to gain respect for neutral rights. By far the most controversial legislation of either of Jefferson’s terms, the Embargo Act of 1807 prohibited vessels from leaving American ports for foreign ports. Technically, it prohibited only exports, but its practical effect was to stop imports as well, for few foreign ships would venture into American ports if they had to leave without cargo. Amazed by the boldness of the act, a British newspaper described the embargo as “little short of an absolute secession from the rest of the civilized world.”

The embargo did not have the intended effect. Although British sales to the United States dropped 50 percent between 1807 and 1808, the British quickly

A British newspaper described the embargo as “little short of an absolute secession from the rest of the civilized world.”
was prosecution for debt. Farmers were devastated. Unable to export their produce or sell it at a decent price to hard-pressed urban dwellers, many farmers could not pay their debts. In desperation, one farmer in Schoharie County, New York, sold his cattle, horses, and farm implements, worth eight hundred dollars before the embargo, for fifty-five dollars. Speculators who had purchased land, expecting to sell it later at a higher price, also took a beating because cash-starved farmers stopped buying land. 

“\text{I live and that is all,}” wrote one New York speculator. “\text{I am doing no business, cannot sell anybody property, nor collect any money.}”

The embargo fell hardest on New England, especially Massachusetts, which in 1807 had twice the ship tonnage per capita of any other state and more than a third of the entire nation’s ship tonnage in foreign trade. For a state so dependent on foreign trade, the embargo was a calamity. Wits reversed the letters of embargo to form the phrase “\text{O grab me.}”

The situation was not entirely bleak. The embargo forced a diversion of merchants’ capital into manufacturing. Before 1808, the United States had only fifteen mills for fashioning cotton into textiles; by the end of 1809, an additional eighty-seven mills had been constructed (as discussed in Chapter 9). But none of this comforted merchants already ruined or mariners driven to soup kitchens. Nor could New Englanders forget that the source of their misery was a policy initiated by one of the “Virginia lordlings,” “\text{Mad Tom}” Jefferson, who knew little about New England and who had a dogmatic loathing of cities, the very foundations of New England’s prosperity. A Massachusetts poet wrote,

\begin{quote}
\text{Our ships all in motion once whitened the ocean,}
\text{They sailed and returned with a cargo}
\text{Now doomed to decay they have fallen a prey}
\text{To Jefferson, worms, and embargo}
\end{quote}

\section*{James Madison and the Failure of Peaceable Coercion}

Even before the Embargo Act, Jefferson had announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection. With his blessing, the Republican congressional caucus nominated James Madison and George Clinton for the presidency and vice presidency. The Federalists countered with Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, the same ticket that had made a negligible showing in 1804. In 1808, the Federalists staged a modest comeback, gaining twenty-four congressional seats. Still, Madison won 122 of 175 electoral votes for president, and the Republicans retained control of Congress.

The Federalist revival, modest as it was, rested on two factors. First, Federalist opposition to the Embargo Act gave the party a national issue it had long lacked. Second, younger Federalists had abandoned their elders’ gentlemanly disdain for campaigning and deliberately imitated vote-winning techniques such as barbecues and mass meetings that had worked for the Republicans.

To some contemporaries, “\text{Little Jenny}” Madison, five feet, four inches tall, seemed a weak and shadowy figure compared to Jefferson. In fact, Madison’s intelligence and capacity for systematic thought matched Jefferson’s. He had the added advantage of being married to Dolley Madison. A striking figure in her turbans and colorful dresses, Dolley arranged receptions at the White House in which she charmed Republicans, and even some Federalists, into sympathy with her husband’s policies.

Madison continued the embargo with minor changes. Like Jefferson, he reasoned that Britain was “more vulnerable in her commerce than in her armies.” The American embargo, however, was coercing no one, and on March 1, 1809, Congress replaced the Embargo Act with the weaker, face-saving Non-Intercourse Act. This act opened trade to all nations except Britain and France and then authorized the president to restore trade with either of those nations if it stopped violating neutral rights. But neither complied. In May 1810, Congress substituted a new measure, Macon’s Bill No. 2. This legislation opened trade with Britain and France, and then offered each a clumsy bribe: if either nation repealed its restrictions on neutral shipping, the United States would halt trade with the other.

None of these steps had the desired effect. While Jefferson and Madison lashed out at France and Britain as moral demons (“\text{The one is a den of robbers and the other of pirates,” snapped Jefferson}), the belligerents saw the world as composed of a few great powers and many weak ones. When great powers went to war, there were no neutrals. Weak nations like the United States should stop babbling about moral ideals and seek the protection of a great power. Neither Napoleon nor the British intended to accommodate the Americans.

As peaceable coercion became a fiasco, Madison came under fire from militant Republicans, known as war hawks, who demanded more aggressive policies. Coming mainly from the South and West, regions where “\text{honor}” was a sacred word, the militants were infuriated by insults to the American flag. In addition, economic recession between 1808 and 1810 had convinced the firebrands that British policies
were wrecking their regions’ economies. The election of 1810 brought several war hawks to Congress. Led by thirty-four-year-old Henry Clay of Kentucky, who preferred war to the “putrescent pool of ignominious peace,” the war hawks included John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, and William King of North Carolina, all future vice presidents. Clay was elected Speaker of the House.

Tecumseh and the Prophet

More emotional and pugnaciously nationalistic than Jefferson and Madison, the war hawks called for the expulsion of the British from Canada and the Spanish from the Floridas. Their demands merged with western settlers’ fears that the British in Canada were actively recruiting the Indians to halt the march of American settlement. In reality, American policy, not meddling by the British, was the source of bloodshed on the frontier.

In contrast to his views about blacks, Jefferson believed that Indians and whites could live peacefully together if the Indians abandoned their hunting and nomadic ways and took up farming. If they farmed, they would need less land. Jefferson and Madison insisted that the Indians be compensated fairly for ceded land and that only those Indians with a claim to the land they were ceding be allowed to conclude treaties with whites. Reality conflicted with Jefferson’s ideals (see Chapter 7). The march of white settlement was steadily shrinking Indian hunting grounds, while some Indians themselves were becoming more willing to sign away land in payment to whites for blankets, guns, and the liquor that transported them into a daze even as their culture collapsed.

In 1809, no American was more eager to acquire Indian lands than William Henry Harrison, the governor of the Indiana Territory. The federal government had just divided Indiana, splitting off the present states of Illinois and Wisconsin into a separate Illinois Territory. Harrison recognized that, shorn of Illinois, Indiana would not achieve statehood unless it could attract more settlers by offering them land currently owned by Indians. Disregarding instructions from Washington to negotiate only with Indians who claimed the land they were ceding, Harrison rounded up a delegation of half-starved Indians, none of whom lived on the rich lands along the Wabash River that he craved. By the Treaty of Fort Wayne in September 1809, these Indians ceded millions of acres along the Wabash at a price of two cents an acre.

This treaty outraged the numerous tribes that had not been party to it. Among the angriest were Tecumseh, the Shawnee chief, and his brother, Lalawéthica. Late in 1805, Lalawéthica had had a frightening dream in which he saw drunken Indians tormented for eternity. Overnight, Lalawéthica was transformed from a drunken misfit into a preacher. He gave up liquor and began pleading with Indians to return to their old ways and to avoid contact with whites. He quickly became known as the Prophet. Soon, he would take a new name, Tenskwatawa, styling himself the “Open Door” through which all Indians could revitalize their culture. Shawnees listened to his message.

In the meantime, Tecumseh sought to build a coalition of several tribes to stem the tide of white settlement. He insisted that Indian lands belonged collectively to all the tribes and hence could not be sold by splinter groups. Failing to reach a settlement with Tecumseh or the Prophet, Harrison concluded that it was time to attack the Indians. His target was a Shawnee encampment called Prophetstown near the mouth of the Tippecanoe River. With Tecumseh away recruiting southern Indians to his cause, Tenskwatawa ordered an attack on Harrison’s encampment, a mile from Prophetstown, in the pre-dawn hours of November 7, 1811. Outnumbered two to one and short of ammunition, Tenskwatawa’s force was beaten off after inflicting heavy casualties.

Although it was a small engagement, the Battle of Tippecanoe had several large effects. It made Harrison a national hero, and the memory of the battle would contribute to his election as president three decades later. It discredited Tenskwatawa, whose conduct during the battle drew criticism from his followers. It elevated Tecumseh into a position of recognized leadership among the western tribes. Finally, it persuaded Tecumseh, who long had distrusted the British as much as the Americans, that alliance with the British was the only way to stop the spread of American settlement.

Congress Votes for War

By spring 1812, President Madison had decided that war with Britain was inevitable. On June 1, he sent his war message to Congress. Meanwhile, an economic depression struck Britain, partly because the American policy of restricting trade with that country had finally started to work. Under pressure from its merchants, Britain suspended the Orders in Council on June 23. But Congress had already passed the declaration of war. Further, Britain’s suspension failed to meet Madison’s demand that Britain unilaterally pledge to respect the rights of neutrals.

Neither war hawks nor westerners held the key to the vote in favor of war. The West was still too sparsely settled to have many representatives in Congress. Rather, the votes of Republicans in
A more important underlying cause was the economic recession that affected the South and West after 1808, as well as the conviction, held by John C. Calhoun and others, that British policy was damaging America’s economy.

Finally, it was vitally important that Madison rather than Jefferson was president in 1812. Jefferson had believed Britain was motivated primarily by its desire to defeat Napoleon, and that once the war in Europe ended, the provocations would stop. Madison held that Britain’s real motive was to strangle American trade once and for all and thereby eliminate the United States as a trading rival. In his war message, he stated flatly that Britain was meddling with American trade not because that trade interfered with Britain’s “belligerent rights” but because it “frustrated the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation.”

The War of 1812

Although American cruisers, notably the Constitution, would win a few sensational duels with British warships, the U.S. Navy could not prevent...
The War of 1812

The British from clamping a naval blockade on the American coast. Canada, which Madison viewed as a key prop of the British Empire, became the principal target. With their vastly larger population and resources, few Americans expected a long or difficult struggle. To Jefferson, the conquest of Canada seemed "a mere matter of marching."

Little justified this optimism. Although many Canadians were immigrants from the United States, to the Americans' surprise they fought to repel the invaders. Many of the best British troops were in Europe fighting Napoleon, but the British enlisted Native Americans—and used fear of these "uncontrollable savages" to force American surrenders. The American state militias were filled with Sunday soldiers who "hollered for water half the time, and whiskey the other." Few militiamen understood the goals of the war. In fact, outside Congress there was not much blood lust in 1812. Opposition to the war ran strong in New England; and even in Kentucky, the home of war hawk Henry Clay, only four hundred answered the first call to arms. For many Americans, local attachments were still stronger than national ones.

On to Canada

From the summer of 1812 to the spring of 1814, the Americans launched a series of unsuccessful attacks on Canada (see Map 8.2). In July 1812,
General William Hull led an American army from Detroit into Canada, quickly returned when Tecumseh cut his supply line, and surrendered Detroit and two thousand men to thirteen hundred British and Indian troops. In the fall of 1812, the British and their Mohawk allies crushed a force of American regulars at the Battle of Queenston, near Niagara Falls, while New York militiamen, contending that they had volunteered only to protect their homes and not to invade Canada, looked on from the New York side of the border. A third American offensive in 1812, a projected attack on Montreal via Lake Champlain, fell apart when the militia again refused to advance into Canada.

Renewed American offensives and subsequent reverses in 1813 convinced the Americans that they could not retake Detroit while the British controlled Lake Erie. During the winter of 1812–1813, Captain Oliver H. Perry constructed a little fleet of vessels; on September 10, 1813, he destroyed a British squadron at Put-in-Bay on the western end of the lake. “We have met the enemy, and they are ours,” Perry triumphantly reported. The British then pulled out of Detroit, but American forces under General William Henry Harrison overtook and defeated a combined British and Indian force at the Battle of the Thames on October 5, where Tecumseh died. These victories by Perry and Harrison cheered Americans, but efforts to invade Canada continued to falter. In June 1814, American troops crossed into Canada on the Niagara front but withdrew after fighting two bloody but inconclusive battles at Chippewa (July 5) and Lundy’s Lane (July 25).

The British Offensive

With fresh reinforcements from Europe, where Napoleon had abdicated as emperor after his disastrous invasion of Russia, the British took the offensive in the summer of 1814. General Sir George Prevost led a force of ten thousand British veterans in an offensive meant to split the New England states, where opposition to the war was strong, from the rest of the country. The British advanced down Lake Champlain until meeting the well-entrenched American forces at Plattsburgh. After his fleet met defeat on September 11, Prevost abandoned the campaign.

Ironically, the British achieved a far more spectacular success in an operation originally designed as a diversion from their main thrust down Lake Champlain. In 1814, a British army landed near Washington and met a larger American force, composed mainly of militia, at Bladensburg, Maryland, on August 24. The Battle of Bladensburg quickly became the “Bladensburg races” as the American militia fled, almost without firing a shot. The British then descended on Washington. Madison, who had witnessed the Bladensburg fiasco, escaped into the Virginia hills. His wife, Dolley, pausing only long enough to load her silver, a bed, and a portrait of George Washington onto her carriage, hastened to join her husband, while British troops ate the supper prepared for the Madisons at the presidential mansion. Then they burned the mansion and other public buildings in Washington. A few weeks later, the British attacked Baltimore, but after failing to crack its defenses, they broke off the operation.

The Treaty of Ghent, 1814

In August 1814, negotiations to end the war commenced between British and American commissioners at Ghent, Belgium. News of the American naval
The War of 1812

Hickory”) Jackson, legendary as a fierce Indian fighter, shredded the line of advancing redcoats, inflicting more than two thousand casualties while losing only thirteen of their own.

The Hartford Convention

Although it meant nothing in terms of the war, the Battle of New Orleans had a devastating effect on the Federalist party. The Federalist comeback in the election of 1808 had continued into the election of 1812, when their candidate DeWitt Clinton, an antiwar Republican, had lost the electoral vote but carried all of New England except Vermont, as well as New York and New Jersey. American military setbacks in the war intensified Federalist disdain for the Madison administration. He seemed to epitomize over a decade of Republican misrule at Federalist expense.

WASHINGTONIANS FLEEING THE CITY AS THE BRITISH INVADE ON AUGUST 24, 1814

As the British approached Washington, Margaret Bayard Smith wrote, “a universal confidence reign’d among our citizens. Few doubted our conquering.” When American resistance crumbled, she was stunned. After viewing the blackened ruins of the Capitol and the president’s mansion, she concluded that Americans must “learn the dreadful[,] horrid trade of war.” (Granger Collection)
than disunion, but to many the proceedings smelled of a traitorous plot. The restoration of peace, moreover, stripped the Federalists of the primary grievance that had fueled the convention. In the election of 1816, Republican James Monroe, Madison’s hand-picked successor and a fellow Virginian, swept the nation over negligible Federalist opposition. He would win reelection in 1820 with only a single dissenting electoral vote. As a force in national politics, the Federalists were finished.

The Awakening of American Nationalism

The United States emerged from the War of 1812 bruised but intact. In its first major war since the Revolution, the Republic had demonstrated not only that it could fight on even terms against a major power but also that republics could fight wars without turning to despotism. The war produced more than its share of symbols of American nationalism. Whitewash cleared the smoke damage to the presidential mansion; thereafter, it became known as the White House. The British attack on Fort McHenry, guarding Baltimore, prompted a young observer, Francis Scott Key, to compose “The Star-Spangled Banner.”

The Battle of New Orleans boosted Andrew Jackson onto the stage of national politics and became a source of legends about American military prowess. It appears to most contemporary scholars that the British lost because as they advanced within range of Jackson’s riflemen and cannon, they unaccountably paused and became sitting ducks. But in the wake of the battle, Americans spun a different tale. The legend arose that Jackson owed his victory not to Pakenham’s blundering tactics but to hawk-eyed Kentucky frontiersmen whose rifles picked off the British with unerring accuracy. In fact, many frontiersmen in Jackson’s army had not carried rifles; even if they had, gunpowder smoke would have obscured the enemy. But none of this mattered at the time. Just as Americans preferred militia to professional soldiers, they chose to believe that their greatest victory of the war had been the handiwork of amateurs.

Madison’s Nationalism and the Era of Good Feelings, 1817–1824

The War of 1812 had three major political consequences. First, it eliminated the Federalists as a national political force. Second, it went a long way toward convincing the Republicans that the nation and its liberties were strong and resilient. Third, with the Federalists no longer a force, and with fears about the fragility of republics fading, Republicans increasingly embraced doctrines long associated with the Federalists.

In a message to Congress in December 1815, Madison called for federal support for internal improvements such as roads and canals, tariff protection for the new industries that had sprung up during the embargo, and the creation of a new national bank. (The charter of the first Bank of the United States had expired in 1811.) In Congress, another Republican, Henry Clay of Kentucky, proposed similar measures, which he called the American System, with the aim of making the young nation economically self-sufficient and free from dependence on Europe. In 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States and enacted a moderate tariff. Federal support for internal improvements proved to be a thornier problem. Madison favored federal aid in principle but believed that a constitutional amendment was necessary to authorize it. Accordingly, just before leaving office in 1817, he vetoed an internal-improvements bill.

As Republicans adopted positions they had once disdained, an “Era of Good Feelings” dawned on American politics. A Boston newspaper, impressed by the warm reception accorded President James Monroe while touring New England, coined the...
Constitution specifically forbade states to interfere with contracts, an effort by New Hampshire to turn Dartmouth into a state university was unconstitutional. The implications of Marshall’s ruling were far-reaching for businesses as well as colleges. In effect, Marshall said that once a state had chartered a college or a business, it surrendered both its power to alter the charter and, in large measure, its authority to regulate the beneficiary.

A few weeks later, the chief justice handed down an even more momentous decision in McCulloch v. Maryland. The issue here was whether the state of Maryland had the power to tax a national corporation, specifically the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States, a national corporation chartered by Congress. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Marshall concentrated on two issues. First, did Congress have the power to charter a national bank? Nothing in the Constitution, Marshall conceded, explicitly granted this power. But the broad sweep of enumerated powers, he reasoned, implied...
States, the bank had made itself unpopular by tightening its loan policies during the summer of 1818. This contraction of credit triggered the Panic of 1819, a severe depression that gave rise to considerable distress throughout the country, especially among western farmers. At a time when the bank was widely blamed for the panic, Marshall's ruling stirred controversy by placing the bank beyond the regulatory power of any state government. His decision, indeed, was as much an attack on state sovereignty as it was a defense of the bank. The Constitution, Marshall argued, was the creation not of state governments but of the people of all the states, and thus was more fundamental than state laws. His reasoning assailed the Republican theory, best expressed in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798–1799 (see Chapter 7), that the Union was essentially a compact among states, which were more immediately responsive to the people's will than the federal government. Republicans regarded the compact theory of the Union as a guarantor of popular liberty. As they saw it, Marshall's McCulloch decision, along with his decision in the Dartmouth College case, stripped state governments of the power to impose the will of their people on corporations.

The Missouri Compromise, 1820–1821

The fragility of the Era of Good Feelings became even more apparent in the two-year-long controversy over statehood for Missouri. Carved from the Louisiana Purchase, Missouri attracted slaveholders. In 1819, when the House of Representatives was considering a bill to admit Missouri as a state, 16 percent of the territory's inhabitants were slaves. Then a New York Republican offered an amendment that prohibited the further introduction of slaves and provided for the emancipation, at age twenty-five, of all slave offspring born after Missouri's admission as a state. Following rancorous debate, the House accepted the amendment, and the Senate rejected it. Both chambers voted along sectional lines.

Prior to 1819, slavery had not been the primary source of the nation's sectional divisions. For example, Federalists' opposition to the embargo and the War of 1812 had sprung from their fear that the dominant Republicans were sacrificing New England's commercial interests to those of the South and West—not from hostility to slavery. The Missouri question, which Jefferson compared to "a fire bell in the night, [which] awakened me and filled me with terror," now thrust slavery into the center of long-standing sectional divisions.

In 1819, the Union had eleven free and eleven slave states. The admission of Missouri as a slave...
The Awakening of American Nationalism

The Missouri Compromise temporarily quelled controversy over slavery by admitting Maine as a free state and Missouri as a slave state, and by prohibiting slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36°30’.

MAP 8.3 THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE, 1820–1821 The Missouri Compromise temporarily quelled controversy over slavery by admitting Maine as a free state and Missouri as a slave state, and by prohibiting slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36°30’—the southern boundary of Missouri (see Map 8.3). But compromise did not come easily. The individual components of the eventual compromise passed by close and ominously sectional votes.

No sooner had the compromise been forged than it nearly fell apart. As a prelude to statehood, Missourians drafted a constitution that prohibited free blacks, whom some eastern states viewed as citizens, from entering their territory. This provision clashed with the federal Constitution’s provision that citizens of one state were entitled to the same rights as citizens of other states. Balking at Missourians’ exclusion of free blacks, antislavery northerners barred Missouri’s admission into the Union until 1821, when Henry Clay engineered a new agreement. This second Missouri Compromise prohibited Missouri from discriminating against citizens of other states but left open the issue of whether free blacks were citizens.

The Missouri Compromise was widely viewed as a southern victory. The South had gained admission of Missouri, whose acceptance of slavery was controversial, while the North had merely gained Maine, whose rejection of slavery inspired no controversy. Yet the South had conceded to freedom a vast block of territory north of 36°30’. Although much of this territory was unorganized Indian state would upset this balance to the advantage of the South. Equally important, Missouri was on the same latitude as the free states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and northerners worried that admitting Missouri as a slave state would set a precedent for the extension of slavery into the northern part of the Purchase. Finally, the disintegration of the Federalists as a national force reduced the need for unity among Republicans, and they increasingly heeded sectional pressures more than calls for party loyalty.

Virtually every issue that was to wrack the Union during the next forty years was present in the controversy over Missouri: southern charges that the North was conspiring to destroy the Union and end slavery; accusations by northerners that southerners were conspiring to extend the institution. Southerners openly proclaimed that antislavery northerners were kindling fires that only “seas of blood” could extinguish. Such threats of civil war persuaded some northern congressmen who had originally supported the restriction of slavery in Missouri to back down. A series of congressional agreements known collectively as the Missouri Compromise resolved the crisis.

To balance the number of free and slave states, Congress in 1820 admitted Maine as a free state and Missouri as a slave state; to forestall a further crisis, it also prohibited slavery in the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36°30’—the southern boundary of Missouri (see Map 8.3). But compromise did not come easily. The individual components of the eventual compromise passed by close and ominously sectional votes.

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country that some viewed as unfit for white habitation, seven states eventually would be formed out of it. Also, the Missouri Compromise reinforced the principle, originally set down by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, that Congress had the right to prohibit slavery in some territories. Southerners had implicitly accepted the argument that slaves were not like other forms of property that could be moved from place to place at will.

**Foreign Policy under Monroe**

American foreign policy between 1816 and 1824 reflected more consensus than conflict. The end of the Napoleonic Wars and the signing of the Treaty of Ghent had removed most of the foreign-policy disagreements between Federalists and Republicans. Moreover, Monroe was fortunate to have as his secretary of state an extraordinary diplomat, John Quincy Adams. The son of the last Federalist president, Adams had been the only Federalist in the Senate to support the Louisiana Purchase, and he later became an ardent Republican. An austere and scholarly man whose library equaled his house in monetary value, Adams was a tough negotiator and a fervent nationalist.

As secretary of state, Adams moved quickly to strengthen the peace with Great Britain. During his tenure, the United States and Britain signed the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, which effectively demilitarized the Great Lakes by severely restricting the number of ships the two powers could maintain there. Next, the British-American Convention of 1818 restored to Americans the same fishing rights off Newfoundland they had enjoyed before the War of 1812 and fixed the boundary between the United States and Canada from the Lake of the Woods west to the Rockies. Beyond the Rockies, the vast country known as Oregon was declared “free and open” to both American and British citizens. As a result of these two agreements, the United States had a secure border with British-controlled Canada for the first time since independence, and a claim to the Pacific.

The nation now turned its attention to dealing with Spain, which still owned East Florida and claimed West Florida. No one was certain whether the Louisiana Purchase included West Florida. Acting as if it did, the United States in 1812 had simply added a slice of West Florida to the state of Louisiana and another slice to the Mississippi Territory. Using the pretext that it was a base for Seminole Indian raids and a refuge for fugitive slaves, Andrew Jackson, now the military commander in the South, invaded East Florida in 1818. He hanged two British subjects and captured Spanish forts. Jackson had acted without explicit orders, but Adams supported the raid, guessing correctly that it would panic the Spanish into further concessions.

In 1819, Spain agreed to the Adams-Onís (Transcontinental) Treaty. By its terms, Spain ceded East Florida to the United States, renounced its claims to West Florida, and agreed to a southern border of the United States west of the Mississippi, by which the United States conceded that Texas was not part of the Louisiana Purchase, while Spain agreed to a northern limit to its claims to the West Coast (see Map 8.3). It thereby left the United States free to pursue its interests in Oregon.

**The Monroe Doctrine, 1823**

John Quincy Adams had long believed that God and nature had ordained that the United States would eventually span the entire continent of North America. Throughout his negotiations leading up to the Adams-Onís Treaty, he made it clear to Spain that, if the Spanish did not concede some of their territory in North America, the United States might seize all of it, including Texas and even Mexico. Yet Spain was concerned with larger issues than American encroachment. Its primary objective was to suppress the revolutions against Spanish rule that had broken out in South America. To accomplish this goal, Spain sought support from the European monarchs who had organized the Holy Alliance in 1815. The brainchild of the tsar of Russia, the Holy Alliance aimed to quash revolutions everywhere in the name of Christian and monarchist principles. Britain, whose trading interests in South America were hampered by Spanish restrictions, refused to join the Holy Alliance. British foreign minister George Canning proposed that the United States and Britain issue a joint statement opposing any European interference in South America, while pledging that neither would annex any part of Spain’s old empire in the New World.

While sharing Canning’s opposition to European intervention in the New World, Adams preferred that the United States make a declaration of policy on its own rather than “come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.” Adams flatly rejected Canning’s insistence on a joint pledge never to annex Spain’s former territories, for Adams wanted the freedom to annex Texas or Cuba, should their inhabitants one day “solicit a union with us.”

This was the background of the Monroe Doctrine, as President Monroe’s message to Congress on December 2, 1823, later came to be called. The message, written largely by Adams, announced three key principles: that unless American interests were involved, U.S. policy was to abstain from European wars; that the “American continents” were not
“subjects for future colonization by any European power”; and that the United States would construe any attempt at European colonization in the New World as an “unfriendly act.”

Europeans widely derided the Monroe Doctrine as an empty pronouncement. Fear of the British navy, not the Monroe Doctrine, prevented the Holy Alliance from intervening in South America. With hindsight, however, the Europeans might have taken the doctrine more seriously, for it had important implications. First, by pledging itself not to interfere in European wars, the United States was excluding the possibility that it would support revolutionary movements in Europe. For example, Adams opposed U.S. recognition of Greek patriots fighting for independence from the Ottoman Turks. Second, by keeping open its options to annex territory in the Americas, the United States was using the Monroe Doctrine to claim a preeminent position in the New World.

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**CHRONOLOGY 1801–1824**

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<td>1816</td>
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CONCLUSION

A newcomer among nations, the United States commanded little international respect in 1801, much more by 1824. During the intervening years, it fought two wars against the Barbary pirates and one against Britain. It doubled its size with the Louisiana Purchase, gained possession of the Floridas, and staked a claim to the Pacific Coast. The vision and leadership of Jefferson, Madison, and John Quincy Adams contributed to American successes. Jefferson’s purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 reflected his view that American liberty depended on the perpetuation of agriculture, and it would bring new states, dominated by Republicans, into the Union. As the Federalist Party waned, Jefferson had to face down challenges from within his own party, notably from the mischief of Aaron Burr and from die-hard old Republicans like John Randolph, who charged that Jefferson was abandoning pure Republican doctrines.

The outbreak of war between Napoleon’s France and Britain, and the threat it posed to American neutrality, preoccupied Jefferson’s second term and both terms of his successor, James Madison. The failure of the embargo and peaceable coercion to force Europeans to respect American neutrality led the United States into war with Britain in 1812. The War of 1812 and its aftermath exemplified how events in Europe sometimes worked to the Americans’ advantage. Although the United States failed to achieve its main war goal, forcing Britain to principled acceptance of neutral rights, Napoleon’s downfall and the end of hostilities in Europe made the issue irrelevant. In addition, the war destroyed the Federalists, who committed political suicide at the Hartford Convention. It also led Madison to jettison part of Jefferson’s legacy by calling for a new national bank, federal support for internal improvements, and protective tariffs. The Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 and the Monroe Doctrine’s bold pronouncement that European powers must not meddle in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere expressed America’s increasingly assertive nationalism.

Conflict was never far below the surface of the apparent consensus. In the absence of Federalist opposition, Republicans began to fragment into sectional factions, most notably in the conflict over Missouri’s admission to the Union as a slave state.

KEY TERMS

John Marshall (p. 221)  
Marbury v. Madison (p. 222)  
Louisiana Purchase (p. 223)  
Lewis and Clark expedition (p. 224)  
Sacajawea (p. 225)  
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FOR FURTHER REFERENCE


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